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Abstract
We define the notion of rational closure in the
context of Description Logics extended with a tipica-
lity operator. We start from ALC +T, an extension of
ALC with a typicality operator T : intuitively allowing
to express concepts of the form T(C), meant to select
the “most normal” instances of a concept C. The se-
mantics we consider is based on rational model. But
we further restrict the semantics to minimal models,
that is to say, to models that minimise the rank of do-
main elements. We show that this semantics captures
exactly a notion of rational closure which is a natural
extension to Description Logics of Lehmann and Magi-
dor’s original one. We also extend the notion of rational
closure to the Abox component. We provide an EXP-
TIME algorithm for computing the rational closure of an
Abox and we show that it is sound and complete with
respect to the minimal model semantics.
1 Introduction
Recently, in the domain of Description Logics (DLs) a
large amount of work has been done in order to extend
the basic formalism with nonmonotonic reasoning features.
The aim of these extensions is to reason about prototypical
properties of individuals or classes of individuals. In these
extensions one can represent for instance knowledge ex-
pressing the fact that the heart is usually positioned in the
left-hand side of the chest, with the exception of people
with situs inversus, that have the heart positioned in the
right-hand side. Also, one can infer that an individual en-
joys all the typical properties of the classes it belongs to.
So, for instance, in the absence of information that so-
meone has situs inversus, one would assume that it has
the heart positioned in the left-hand side. A further objec-
tive of these extensions is to allow to reason about defeasi-
bile properties and inheritance with exceptions. As another
example, consider the standard penguin example, in which
typical birds fly, however penguins are birds that do not fly.
Nonmonotonic extensions of DLs allow to attribute to an
individual the typical properties of the most specific class
it belongs to. In this example, when knowing that Tweety
is a bird, one would conclude that it flies, whereas when
discovering that it is also a penguin, the previous inference
is retracted, and the fact that Tweety does not fly is conclu-
ded.
In the literature of DLs, several proposals have appeared
[20, 2, 1, 7, 14, 5, 12, 3, 16, 8, 19]. However, finding a so-
lution to the problem of extending DLs for reasoning about
prototypical properties seems far from being solved.
In this paper, we introduce a general framework for non-
monotonic reasoning in DLs based on (i) the use of a ty-
picality operator T ; (ii) a minimal model mechanism (in
the spirit of circumscription). The typicality operator T, in-
troduced in [9], allows to directly express typical proper-
ties such as T(HeartPosition) ⊑ Left , T(Bird ) ⊑ Fly ,
and T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly , whose intuitive meaning is that
normally, the heart is positioned in the left-hand side of
the chest, that typical birds fly, whereas penguins do not.
The T operator is intended to enjoy the well-established
properties of preferential semantics, described by Kraus
Lehmann and Magidor (henceforth KLM) in their semi-
nal work [15, 17]. KLM proposed an axiomatic approach
to nonmonotonic reasoning, and individuated two systems,
preferential logic P and rational logic R, and their corres-
ponding semantics. It is commonly accepted that the sys-
tems P and R express the core properties of nonmonotonic
reasoning.
In [12, 11] nonmonotonic extensions of DLs based on
the T operator have been proposed. In these extensions, the
semantics of T is based on preferential logic P. Nonmo-
notonic inference is obtained by restricting entailment to
minimal models, where minimal models are those that mi-
nimise the truth of formulas of a special kind. In this work,
we present an alternative and more general approach. First,
in our framework the semantics underlying the T operator
is not fixed once for all : although we consider here only
KLM’s P or R as underlying semantics, in principle one
might choose any other underlying semantics for T based
on a modal preference relation. Moreover and more impor-
tantly, we adopt a minimal model semantics, where, as a
difference with the previous approach, the notion of mini-
mal model is completely independent from the language
and is determined only by the relational structure of mo-
dels.
The semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning in
DLs presented in this work is an extension of the one des-
cribed in [13] within a propositional context. We then pro-
pose a rational closure construction for DL extended with
the T operator as an algorithmic counterpart of our mini-
mal model semantics, whenever the underlying logic for
T is KLM logic R. Rational closure is a well-established
notion introduced in [17] as a nonmonotonic mechanism
built on the top of R in order to perform some further tru-
thful nonmonotonic inferences that are not supported by R
alone. We extend it to DLs in a natural way, so that, in turn,
we can see our minimal model semantics as a semantical
reconstruction of rational closure.
More in details, we takeALC+T as the underlying DL
and we define a nonmonotonic inference relation on the top
of it by restricting entailment to minimal models : they are
those ones which minimize the rank of domain elements
by keeping fixed the extensions of concepts and roles. We
then proceed to extend in a natural way the propositional
construction of rational closure to ALC + T for inferring
defeasible subsumptions from the TBox (TBox reasoning).
Intuitively the rational closure construction amounts to as-
signing a rank (a level of exceptionality) to every concept ;
this rank is used to evaluate defeasible inclusions of the
form T(C) ⊑ D : the inclusion is supported by the ra-
tional closure whenever the rank of C is strictly smaller
than the one of C ⊓ ¬D. Our goal is to link the rational
closure of a TBox to its minimal model semantics, but in
general it is not possible. The reason is that the minimal
model semantics is not tight enough to support the infe-
rences provided by the rational closure. However we can
obtain an exact corresponce between the two if we further
restrict the minimal model semantics to canonical models :
these are models that satisfy by means of a distinct element
each intersection (C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn) of concepts drawn from
the KB that is satisfiable with respect to the TBox.
We then tackle the problem of extending the rational clo-
sure to ABox reasoning : we would like to ascribe defea-
sible properties to individuals. The idea is to maximise the
typicality of an individual : the more is “typical”, the more
it inherits the defeasible properties of the classes it belongs
too (being a typical member of them). We obtain this by
minimizing its rank (that is, its level of exceptionality), ho-
wever, because of the interaction between individuals (due
to roles) it is not possible to assign a unique minimal rank
to each individual and alternative minimal ranks must be
considered. We end up with a kind of skeptical inference
with respect the ABox. We prove that it is sound and com-
plete with respect to the minimal model semantics restric-
ted to canonical models.
The rational closure construction that we propose has
not just a theoretical interest and a simple minimal mo-
del semantics, we show that it is also feasible since its
complexity is “only” EXPTIME in the size of the know-
ledge base (and the query), thus not worse than the under-
lying monotonic logic. In this respect it is less complex
than other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in DLs
[12, 2] and comparable in complexity with the approaches
in [5, 4, 19], and thus a good candidate to define effective
nonmonotonic extensions of DLs.
2 The operator T and the General Se-
mantics
Let us briefly recall the DLs ALC + T and ALCRT
introduced in [9, 10], respectively. The intuitive idea is to
extend the standard ALC allowing concepts of the form
T(C), where C does not mention T, whose intuitive mea-
ning is that T(C) selects the typical instances of a concept
C. We can therefore distinguish between the properties that
hold for all instances of conceptC (C ⊑ D), and those that
only hold for the typical instances of C (T(C) ⊑ D) that
we call T-inclusions, where C is a concept not mentioning
T. Formally, the language is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 We consider an alphabet of concept names
C, of role names R, and of individual constants O. Given
A ∈ C and R ∈ R, we define CR := A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬CR |
CR ⊓ CR | CR ⊔ CR | ∀R.CR | ∃R.CR, and CL :=
CR | T(CR). A KB is a pair (TBox, ABox). TBox contains
a finite set of concept inclusions CL ⊑ CR. ABox contains
assertions of the form CL(a) and R(a, b), where a, b ∈ O.
The semantics ofALC+T andALCRT is defined respec-
tively in terms of preferential and rational 1 models : ordi-
nary models ofALC are equipped by a preference relation
< on the domain, whose intuitive meaning is to compare
the “typicality” of domain elements, that is to say x < y
1. We use the expression “rational model” rather than “ranked model”
which is also used in the literature in order to avoid any confusion with
the notion of rank used in rational closure.
means that x is more typical than y. Typical members of
a concept C, that is members of T(C), are the members
x of C that are minimal with respect to this preference
relation (s.t. there is no other member of C more typical
than x). Preferential models, in which the preference rela-
tion < is irreflexive and transitive, characterize the logic
ALC + T, whereas the more restricted class of rational
models, so that < is further assumed to be modular, cha-
racterizes ALCRT.
Definition 2.2 (Semantics of ALC +T) A model M of
ALC + T is any structure 〈∆, <, I〉 where : ∆ is the
domain ; < is an irreflexive and transitive relation over
∆ that satisfies the following Smoothness Condition : for
all S ⊆ ∆, for all x ∈ S, either x ∈ Min<(S) or
∃y ∈ Min<(S) such that y < x, where Min<(S) =
{u : u ∈ S and ∄z ∈ S s.t. z < u} ; I is the exten-
sion function that maps each concept C to CI ⊆ ∆, and
each role R to RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I . For concepts of ALC, CI
is defined in the usual way. For the T operator, we have
(T(C))I =Min<(C
I).
Definition 2.3 (Semantics of ALCRT) A model M of
ALCRT is anALC+T model as in Definition 2.2 in which
< is further assumed to be modular : for all x, y, z ∈ ∆, if
x < y then either x < z or z < y.
Definition 2.4 (Model satisfying a Knowledge Base)
Given a model M, I is extended to assign a distinct
element 2 aI of the domain ∆ to each individual constant
a of O. M satisfies a knowledge base K=(TBox,ABox),
if it satisfies both its TBox and its ABox, where : - M
satisfies TBox if for all inclusions C ⊑ D in TBox, it holds
CI ⊆ DI ; -M satisfies ABox if : (i) for all C(a) in ABox,
aI ∈ CI , (ii) for all aRb in ABox, (aI , bI) ∈ RI .
In [9] it has been shown that reasoning in ALC + T is
EXPTIME complete, that is to say adding the T operator
does not affect the complexity of the underlying DL ALC.
We are able to extend the same result also forALCRT (we
omit the proof due to space limitations) :
Theorem 2.5 (Complexity of ALCRT) Reasoning in
ALCRT is EXPTIME complete.
From now on, we restrict our attention to ALCRT and to
finite models. Given a knowledge base K and an inclusion
CL ⊑ CR, we say that it is derivable from K (we write
K |=ALCRT CL ⊑ CR) if CIL ⊆ CIR holds in all models
M = 〈∆, <, I〉 satisfying K .
Definition 2.6 The rank kM of a domain element x in M
is the length of the longest chain x0 < . . . < x from x to a
x0 such that for no x′ it holds that x′ < x0.
2. We assume the well-established unique name assumption.
FiniteALCRT models can be equivalently defined by pos-
tulating the existence of a function k : ∆ → N, and then
letting x < y iff k(x) < k(y).
Definition 2.7 Given a model M = 〈∆, <, I〉, the rank
kM(CR) of a concept CR in M is i = min{kM(x) :
x ∈ CIR}. If CIR = ∅, then CR has no rank and we write
kM(CR) =∞.
It is immediate to verify that :
Proposition 2.8 For anyM = 〈∆, <, I〉, we have thatM
satisfies T(C) ⊑ D iff kM(C ⊓D) < kM(C ⊓ ¬D).
As already mentioned, although the typicality operator T
itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C) ⊑ D does not imply
T(C ⊓ E) ⊑ D), the logics ALC + T and ALCRT are
monotonic : what is inferred from K can still be inferred
from any K ′ with K ⊆ K ′. In order to define a nonmono-
tonic entailment we introduce the second ingredient of our
minimal model semantics. As in [12], we strengthen the
semantics by restricting entailment to a class of minimal
(or preferred) models, more precisely to models that mini-
mize the rank of worlds. Informally, given two models of
K , one in which a given x has rank 2 (because for instance
z < y < x) , and another in which it has rank 1 (because
only y < x), we would prefer the latter, as in this model x
is “more normal” than in the former. We call the new logic
ALCRminT.
Let us define the notion of query. Intuitively, a query is
either an inclusion relation or an assertion of the ABox, and
we want to check whether it is entailed from a given KB.
Definition 2.9 (Query) A query F is either an assertion
CL(a) or an inclusion relation CL ⊑ CR. Given a model
M = 〈∆, <, I〉, a query F = CL(a) holds in M if aI ∈
CIL, whereas a query F = CL ⊑ CR holds in M if CIL ⊆
CIR.
In analogy with circumscription, there are mainly two
ways of comparing models with the same domain : 1) by
keeping the valuation function fixed (only comparing M
and M′ if I and I ′ in the two models respectively coin-
cide) ; 2) by also comparing M and M′ in case I 6= I ′. In
this work we consider the semantics resulting from the first
alternative, whereas we leave the study of the other one for
future work (see Section 5 below). The semantics we intro-
duce is a fixed interpretations minimal semantics, for short
FIMS .
Definition 2.10 (FIMS ) Given M = 〈∆, <, I〉 and
M′ = 〈∆′, <′, I ′〉 we say that M is preferred to M′
(M <FIMS M′) if ∆ = ∆′, I = I ′, and for all x ∈ ∆,
kM(x) ≤ kM′(x) whereas there exists y ∈ ∆ such that
kM(y) < kM′(y).
Given a knowledge base K , we say thatM is a minimal
model of K with respect to <FIMS if it is a model satis-
fying K and there is no M′ model satisfying K such that
M′ <FIMS M.
Next, we extend the notion of minimal model by also ta-
king into account the individuals named in the ABox.
Definition 2.11 (Model minimally satisfying K)
Given K=(TBox,ABox), let M = 〈∆, <, I〉 and
M′ = 〈∆′, <′, I ′〉 be two models of K which are
minimal w.r.t. Definition 2.10. We say that M is preferred
toM′ with respect to ABox (M <ABox M′) if for all indi-
vidual constants a occurring in ABox, kM(aI) ≤ kM(aI
′
)
and there is at least one individual constant b occurring
in ABox such that kM(bI) < kM(bI
′
). M minimally
satisfies K in case there is no M′ satisfying K such that
M′ <ABox M.
We say that K minimally entails a query F (K |=min F )
if F holds in all models that minimally satisfy K .
3 A Semantical Reconstruction of Ratio-
nal Closure in DLs
In this section we provide a definition of the well known
rational closure, described in [17], in the context of Des-
cription Logics. We then provide a semantic characteriza-
tion of it within the semantics described in the previous
section.
Definition 3.1 Let K be a DL knowledge base and C a
concept. C is said to be exceptional for K iff K |=ALCRT
T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C.
Let us now extend Lehmann and Magidor’s definition of
rational closure to a DL knowledge base. First, we remem-
ber that the T operator satisfies a set of postulates that
are essentially a reformulation of KLM axioms of ratio-
nal logic R : in this respect, in [9] it is shown that the
T-assertion T(C) ⊑ D is equivalent to the conditional
assertion C |∼ D of KLM logic R. We say that a T-
inclusion T(C) ⊑ D is exceptional for K if C is excep-
tional for K . The set of T-inclusions which are exceptio-
nal for K will be denoted as E(K). Also in this case, it
is possible to define a sequence of non-increasing subsets
of K E0 ⊇ E1, . . . by letting E0 = K and, for i > 0,
Ei = E(Ei−1) ∪ {C ⊑ D ∈ K s.t. T does not occurr in
C}. Observe that, beingK finite, there is a n ≥ 0 such that
for all m > n,Em = En or Em = ∅.
Definition 3.2 A concept C has rank i (denoted by
rank(C) = i) for K iff i is the least natural number for
which C is not exceptional for Ei. If C is exceptional for
all Ei then rank(C) =∞, and we say that C has no rank.
The notion of rank of a formula allows to define the rational
closure of the TBox of a knowledge base K .
Definition 3.3 [Rational closure of TBox] Let
K=(TBox,ABox) be DL knowledge base. We define
the rational closure TBox of TBox of K where
TBox = {T(C) ⊑ D | either rank(C) < rank(C ⊓ ¬D)
or rank(C) =∞} ∪ {C ⊑ D | K |=ALC C ⊑ D}
It is worth noticing that Definition 3.3 takes into account
the monotonic logical consequences C ⊑ D with respect
to ALC. This is due to the fact that the language here is
richer than that considered by Lehmann and Magidor, who
only considers the set of conditionals C |∼ D that, as said
above, correspond to T-inclusions T(C) ⊑ D. The above
Definition 3.3 also takes into account classical inclusions
C ⊑ D that belong to our language.
In the following we show that the minimal model seman-
tics defined in the previous section can be used to provide
a semantical characterization of rational closure.
First of all, we can observe that FIMS as it is can-
not capture the rational closure of a TBox. For instance,
consider the knowledge base K =(TBox,∅) of the penguin
example, where TBox contains the following inclusions :
Penguin ⊑ Bird , T(Bird) ⊑ Fly , T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly .
We observe thatK 6|=FIMS T(Penguin⊓Black ) ⊑ ¬Fly .
Indeed in FIMS there can be a model M = 〈∆, <, I〉
in which ∆ = {x, y, z}, PenguinI = {x, y}, BirdI =
{x, y, z}, FlyI = {x, z}, Black I = {x}, and z < y < x.
M is a model ofK , and it is minimal with respect to FIMS
(indeed it is not possible to lower the rank of x nor of y
nor of z unless we falsify K). Furthermore, x is a typical
black penguin in M (since there is no other black penguin
preferred to it) that flies. On the contrary, it can be veri-
fied that T(Penguin ⊓ Black ) ⊑ ¬Fly ∈ TBox . Things
change if we considerFIMS applied to models that contain
a distinct domain element for each combination of concepts
consistent with K . We call these models canonical mo-
dels. In the example, if we restrict our attention to models
M = 〈∆, <, I〉 that also contain a w ∈ ∆ which is a black
penguin that does not fly, that is to say w ∈ PenguinI ,
w ∈ Bird I , w ∈ Black I , and w 6∈ FlyI and can therefore
be assumed to be a typical penguin, we are able to conclude
that typically black penguins do not fly, as in rational clo-
sure. Indeed, in all minimal models of K that also contain
w with w ∈ PenguinI , w ∈ Bird I , w ∈ Black I , and
w 6∈ FlyI , it holds that T(Penguin ⊓ Black ) ⊑ ¬Fly .
From now on, we restrict our attention to canonical mi-
nimal models.
Given a knowledge base K and a query F , we call S the
set of all concepts occurring (even as subconcepts) either
in K or in F , as well as of their complements. In order to
define canonical minimal models, we consider the set of all
consistent sets of concepts that are consistent withK . A set
of concepts {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} ⊆ S is consistent with K if
K 6|=ALC C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn ⊑ ⊥.
Definition 3.4 (Canonical minimal model w.r.t. K and F )
Given K and a query F , a minimal model M = 〈∆, <, I〉
satisfying K is said to be canonical w.r.t. K and F if it
contains at least a distinct domain element x ∈ ∆ s.t.
x ∈ CI for each combination C in S consistent with K .
We can prove the following results :
Proposition 3.5 Let M be a minimal canonical model of
K . For all concepts C ∈ S, it holds that rank(C) =
kM(C).
The proof can be done by induction on the rank of concept
C.
Theorem 3.6 Given K , we have that C ⊑ D ∈ TBox if
and only if C ⊑ D holds in all canonical minimal models
with respect to K and C ⊑ D.
This thoerem directly follows from Proposition 3.5. Due to
space limitations we omit the proofs.
4 Rational Closure Over the ABox
In this section we extend the notion of rational closure
defined in the previous section in order to take into account
the individual constants in the ABox. We therefore address
the question : what does the rational closure of a knowledge
baseK allow us to infer about a specific individual constant
a occurring in the ABox of K ? We propose the algorithm
below to answer this question and we show that it corres-
ponds to what is entailed by the minimal model semantics
presented in the previous section. The idea of the algorithm
is that of considering all the possible minimal consistent
assignments of ranks to the individuals explicitly named in
the ABox. Each assignment adds some properties to named
individuals which can be used to infer new conclusions. We
adopt a skeptical view of considering only those conclu-
sions which hold for all assignments. The equivalence with
the semantics shows that the minimal entailment captures
a skeptical approach when reasoning about the ABox.
Definition 4.1 (Rational closure of ABox) • Let
a1, . . . , am be the individuals explicitly named in the
ABox. Let k1, k2, . . . , kh all the possible rank assignments
(ranging from 1 to n) to the individuals occurring in ABox.
• We find the consistent kj with (TBox , ABox), where :
- for all ai in ABox, we define µji = {(¬C ⊔ D)(ai)
s.t. C,D ∈ S, T(C) ⊑ D in TBox , and kj(ai) ≤
rank(C)} ∪ {(¬C ⊔D)(ai) s.t. C ⊑ D in TBox } ;
- let µj = µj
1
∪ . . . ∪ µjn for all µj1 . . . µjn just calculated ;
- kj is consistent with (TBox , ABox) if ABox ∪µj is
consistent in ALC.
•We consider the minimal consistent kj i.e. those for which
there is no ki consistent wih (TBox , ABox) s.t. for all ai,
ki(ai) ≤ kj(ai) and for a b, ki(b) < kj(b).
•We define the rational closure of ABox, denoted as ABox ,
the set of all assertions derivable in ALC from ABox ∪µj
for all minimal consistent rank assignments kj , i.e :
ABox =
⋂
kj
{C(a) : ABox ∪µj |=ALC C(a)}
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness of ABox ) Given K=(TBox,
ABox), for all a individual constant in ABox, we have that
if C(a) ∈ ABox then C(a) holds in all minimal canonical
models of K .
Proof. [Fact 0] For any minimal canonical model M of
K= (TBox, ABox) there is a minimal rank assignment kj
consistent with respect to (TBox , ABox), such that for
all a in ABox and all C : if ABox ∪µj |=ALC C(a)
then C(a) holds in M. This can be proven as follows.
Let M be a minimal canonical model of K . Let kj be
the rank assignment corresponding to M : s.t. for all ai
in ABox kj(ai) = kM(aiI). Obviously kj is minimal.
Furthermore, M |= ABox ∪µj . Indeed, M |= ABox
by hypothesis. To show that M |= µj we reason as fol-
lows : for all ai let (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) ∈ µji . If aiI ∈ (¬C)I
clearly (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) holds in M. On the other hand, if
ai
I ∈ (C)I : by hypothesis rank(C) ≥ kj(ai) hence by
the correspondence between rank of a formula in the ratio-
nal closure and in minimal canonical models (see Proposi-
tion 3.5) also kM(C) ≥ kM(aiI), but since aiI ∈ (C)I ,
kM(C) = kM(ai
I), therefore aiI ∈ (T(C))I . By defini-
tion of µi, and since by Theorem 3.6, M |= TBox , D(ai)
holds in M and therefore also aiI ∈ (¬C ⊔D)I . Hence, if
ABox ∪µj |=ALC C(ai) then C(ai) holds in M.
Let C(a) ∈ ABox , and suppose for a contradiction that
there is a minimal canonical modelM of K s.t. C(a) does
not hold in M. By Fact 0 there must be a kj s.t. ABox
∪µj 6|=ALC C(a), but this contradicts the fact that C(a) ∈
ABox . ThereforeC(a) must hold in all minimal canonical
models of K . 
Theorem 4.3 (Completeness of ABox ) GivenK=(TBox,
ABox), for all a individual constant in ABox, we have that
if C(a) holds in all minimal canonical models of K then
C(a) ∈ ABox .
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Suppose C(a) 6∈
ABox , i.e. there is a minimal kj consistent with (TBox ,
ABox) s.t. ABox ∪µj 6|=ALC C(a). We build a minimal
canonical model M = 〈∆, < I〉 of K such that C(ai)
does not hold in M as follows. Let ∆ = ∆0 ∪∆1 where
∆0 = {{C1, . . . Ck} ⊆ S : {C1, . . . Ck} is maximal
and consistent with K} and ∆1 = {ai : ai in ABox }.
We define the rank kM of each domain element as fol-
lows : kM({C1, . . . Ck}) = rank(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Ck), and
kM(ai) = kj(ai). We then define < in the obvious way :
x < y iff kM(x) < kM(y).
We then define I as follows. First for all ai in ABox
we let aIi = ai. For the interpretation of concepts we
reason in two different ways for ∆0 and ∆1. For ∆0,
for all atomic concepts C′, we let {C1, . . . , Ck} ∈ C′I
iff C′ ∈ {C1, . . . , Ck}. I then extends to boolean com-
binations of concepts in the usual way. It can be easily
shown that for any boolean combination of concepts C′,
{C1, . . . , Ck} ∈ C′I iff C′ ∈ {C1, . . . , Ck}. For ∆1, we
start by considering a model M′ = 〈∆′, <, I ′〉 such that
M′ |= ABox ∪µj and M′ 6|= C(a). This model exists by
hypothesis. For all atomic concepts C′, we let ai ∈ C′I
in M iff (ai)I
′
∈ C′I
′
in M′. Of course for any boolean
combination of concepts C′, (ai) ∈ C′I iff (ai)I
′
∈ C′I
′
.
In order to conclude the model’s construction, for each
roleR, we defineRI as follows. ForX,Y ∈ ∆0, (X,Y ) ∈
RI iff {C′ : ∀R.C′ ∈ X} ⊆ Y . For ai, aj ∈ ∆1, (ai, aj) ∈
RI iff ((ai)I
′
, (aj)
I′) ∈ RI
′ in M′. For ai ∈ ∆1, X ∈
∆0, (ai, X) ∈ RI iff there is an x ∈ ∆′ of M′ such that
(aI
′
i , x) ∈ R
I′ in M′ and, for all concepts C′, we have
x ∈ C′I
′ iff X ∈ C′I . I is extended to quantified concepts
in the usual way. It can be shown that for all X ∈ ∆0 for
all (possibly) quantified C′, X ∈ (C′)I iff C′ ∈ X , and
that for all ai in ∆1, for all quantified C′, ai ∈ (C′)I iff
ai ∈ (C′)I
′
.
M satisfies ABox : for aiRaj in ABox this holds by
construction. For C′(ai), this holds since (ai)I
′
∈ (C′)I
′
in M′, hence (ai)I ∈ (C′)I in M.
M satisfies TBox : for elements X ∈ ∆0, this can be
proven as in Theorem 3.6. For ∆1 this holds since it held
in M′. For the inclusion Cl ⊑ Cj this is obvious. For
T(Cl) ⊑ Cj , for all ai we reason as follows. First of all,
if kj(ai) > rank(Cl) then ai 6∈ Min<(ClI) and the in-
clusion trivially holds. On the other if kj(ai) ≤ rank(Cl),
(¬Cl ⊔Cj)(ai) ∈ µj , and therefore (ai)I
′
∈ (¬Cl ⊔Cj)I
′
inM′, hence (ai)I ∈ (¬Cl ⊔Cj)I in M, and we are done.
C(a) does not hold in M, since it does not hold in
M′. Last, M is minimal : if it was not so there would be
M′ < M. However it can be shown that we could define
a kj′ consistent with (TBox , ABox) and preferred to kj ,
thus contradicting the minimality of kj , against the hypo-
thesis. We have then built a minimal canonical model of
K in which C(a) does not hold. The theorem follows by
contraposition. 
Example 4.4 Consider the standard penguin example. Let
K = (TBox, ABox), where TBox = {T(B) ⊑ F,T(P ) ⊑
¬F, P ⊑ B}, and ABox = {P (i), B(j)}.
Computing the ranking of concepts we get that
rank(B) = 0, rank(P ) = 1, rank(B ⊓ ¬F ) = 1,
rank(P ⊓ F ) = 2. It is easy to see that a rank assign-
ment k0 with k0(i) = 0 is inconsistent with K as µ0i would
contain (¬P ⊔ B)(i) , (¬B ⊔ F )(i), (¬P ⊔ ¬F )(i) and
P (i). Thus we are left with only two ranks k1 and k2 with
respectively k1(i) = 1, k1(j) = 0 and k2(i) = k2(j) = 1.
The set µ1 contains, among the others, (¬P ⊔ ¬F )(i) ,
(¬B ⊔F )(j). It is tedious but esay to check that K ∪ µ1 is
consistent and it is the only minimal consistent one (being
k1 preferred to k2, thus both ¬F (i) and F (j) belong to
ABox .
Example 4.5 This example shows the need of conside-
ring multiple ranks of individual constants : normally com-
puter science courses (CS) are taught only by academic
members (A), whereas business courses (B) are taught
only by consultants (C), consultants and academics are
disjointed, this gives the following TBox : T(CS) ⊑
∀taught.A, T(B) ⊑ ∀taught.C, C ⊑ ¬A. Suppose
the ABox contains : CS(c1), B(c2), taught(c1, joe),
taught(c2, joe) and let K= (TBox, ABox). Computing ra-
tional closure of TBox, we get that all atomic concepts have
rank 0. Any rank assignment ki with ki(c1) = ki(c2) = 0,
is inconsistent with K since the respective µi will contain
both (¬CS⊔∀taught.A)(c1) and (¬B⊔∀taught.C)(c2),
from which both C(joe) and A(joe) follow, which gives
an inconsistency.
There are two minimal consistent ranks : k1, such that
k1(joe) = 0, k1(c1) = 0, k1(c2) = 1, and k2, such that
k2(joe) = 0, k2(c1) = 1, k2(c2) = 0. We have that ABox
∪µ1 |= A(joe) and ABox ∪µ2 |= C(joe). According
to the skeptical definition of ABox neither A(joe), nor
C(joe) belongs to ABox , however (A ⊔ C)(joe) belongs
to ABox .
Let us conclude this section by estimating the complexity
of computing the rational closure of the ABox :
Theorem 4.6 (Complexity of rational closure over the ABox)
Given a knowledge base K =(TBox,ABox), an individual
constant a and a concept C, the problem of deciding
whether C(a) ∈ ABox is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. Let |K| be the size of the knowledge base K and
let the size of the query be O(|K|). As the number of in-
clusions in the knowledge base is O(|K|), then the num-
ber n of non-increasing subsets Ei in the construction of
the rational closure is O(|K|). Moreover, the number k
of named individuals in the knowledge base is O(|K|).
Hence, the number kn of different rank assignments to in-
dividuals is such that both k and n are O(|K|). Observe
that kn = 2Log kn = 2nLog k. Hence, kn is O(2nk), with
n and k linear in |K|, i.e., the number of different rank as-
signments is exponential in |K|.
To evaluate the complexity of the algorithm for compu-
ting the rational closure of the ABox, observe that :
(i) For each j, the number of sets µji is k (which is linear
in |K|). The number of inclusions in each µji is O(|K|2),
as the size of S is O(|K|) and the number of T-inclusions
T(C) ⊑ D ∈ TBox , with C,D ∈ S is O(|K|2). Hence,
the size of set µj is O(|K|3).
(ii) For each kj , the consistency of (TBox , ABox) can be
verified by checking the consistency of ABox ∪µj inALC,
which requires exponential time in the size of the set of for-
mulas ABox ∪µj (which, as we have seen, is polynomial
in the size of K). Hence, the consistency of each kj can be
verified in exponential time in the size of K .
(iii) The identification of the minimal assignments kj
among the consistent ones requires the comparison of each
consistent assignment with each other (i.e. k2 compari-
sons), where each comparison between kj and kj′ requires
k steps. Hence, the identification of the minimal assign-
ments requires k3 steps.
(iv) To define the rational closure ABox of ABox, for each
conceptC occurring inK or in the query (there areO(|K|)
many concepts), and for each named individual ai, we have
to check if C(ai) is derivable in ALC from ABox ∪µj for
all minimal consistent rank assignments kj . As the num-
ber of different minimal consistent assignments kj is ex-
ponential in |K|, this requires an exponential number of
checks, each one requiring exponential time in the size of
the knowledge base |K|. The cost of the overall algorithm
is therefore exponential in the size of the knowledge base.

5 Conclusions and Related works
We have defined a rational closure construction for the
Description LogicALC extended with a tipicality operator
and provided a minimal model semantics for it based on the
idea of minimizing the rank of objects in the domain, that is
their level of “untypicality”. This semantics correspond to a
natural extension to DLs of Lehmann and Magidor’s notion
of rational closure. We have also extended the notion of
rational closure to the ABox, by providing an algorithm
for computing it that is sound and complete with respect
to the minimal model semantics. Last, we have shown an
EXPTIME upper bound for the algorithm.
In future work, we will consider a further ingredient in
the recipe for nonmonotonic DLs. In analogy with circum-
scription, we can consider a stronger form of minimization
where we minimize the rank of domain elements, but we
allow to vary the extensions of concepts. Nonmonotonic
extensions of low complexity DLs based on the T operator
have been recently provided [11]. In future works, we aim
to study the application of the proposed semantics to DLs
of the EL and DL-Lite families, in order to define a rational
closure for low complexity DLs.
[5] discusses the application of rational closure to DLs.
The authors first describe a construction to compute ratio-
nal closure in the context of propositional logic, then they
adapt such a construction to the DL ALC. As [5] extends
to DLs a construction which, in the propositional case, is
proved to be equivalent to Lehmann and Magidor’s ratio-
nal closure, it may be conjectured that their construction is
equivalent to our definition of rational closure in Section
3, which is the natural extension of Lehmann and Magi-
dor’s definition. [5] keeps the ABox into account, and de-
fines closure operations over individuals. They introduce a
consequence relation  among a KB and assertions, under
the requirement that the TBox is unfoldable and the ABox
is closed under completion rules, such as, for instance, that
if a : ∃R.C ∈ ABox, then both aRb and b : C (for some
individual constant b) must belong to the ABox too. Un-
der such restrictions they are able to define a procedure to
compute the rational closure of the ABox assuming that
the individuals explicitly named are linearly ordered, and
different orders determine different sets of consequences.
They show that, for each order s, the consequence relation
s is rational and can be computed in PSPACE. In a sub-
sequent work [6], the authors introduce an approach based
on the combination of rational closure and Defeasible In-
heritance Networks (INs).
The logic ALCRT we consider as our base language is
equivalent to the logic for defeasible subsumptions in DLs
proposed by [3], when considered with ALC as the under-
lying DL. The idea underlying this approach is very similar
to that of ALCRT : some objects in the domain are more
typical than others. In the approach by [3], x is more ty-
pical than y if x ≥ y. The properties of ≥ correspond to
those of < in ALCRT. At a syntactic level the two lo-
gics differ, so that in [3] one finds the defeasible inclusions
C ⊏˜ D instead of T(C) ⊑ D of ALC
R
T, however it has
be shown in [10] that the logic of preferential subsumption
can be translated into ALCRT by replacing C ⊏
˜
D with
T(C) ⊑ D.
In [4] the semantics of the logic of defeasible inclusions
is strenghtened by a preferential semantics. Intuitively, gi-
ven a TBox, the authors first introduce a preference orde-
ring ≪ on the class of all subsumption relations ⊏
˜
inclu-
ding TBox, then they define the rational closure of TBox as
the most preferred relation ⊏˜ w.r.t. ≪, i.e. such that thereis no other relation ⊏˜
′ such that TBox ⊆ ⊏˜
′ and ⊏˜
′ ≪ ⊏˜ .Furthermore, the authors describe an EXPTIME algorithm
in order to compute the rational closure of a given TBox.
However, they do not address the problem of dealing with
the ABox. In [18] a plug-in for the Protégé ontology editor
implementing the mentioned algorithm for computing the
rational closure for a TBox for OWL ontologies is descri-
bed.
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